**Emile Durkheim’s View on the Truth of Religion as an Expression of Social Reality: A sociological Analysis**

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**Abstract**

Religion and the study of religion and its origins have inspired many thinkers and philosophers of the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries; especially Anthropologists and Sociologists. This theoretical study deals with the idea and viewpoints of the French sociologist Emile Durkheim (1858 – 1917) and tries to illustrate and analyse his argument asserting the “truth of religion as an expression of social reality”. Durkheim however explained religion in relation to society in a very strict sense, as it was the product of society and in turn it reinforced society. He undertook one of the most comprehensive studies of religion to date in order to find genesis, ***The*** ***Elementary Forms of Religious*** ***Life*** and integrate this study into his wider sociology. It should be emphasised that this study has been done according to an explanatory approach which is applied in both fields of sociology of religion and of political sociology. The study is divided into seven sections. The first one devoted to the introduction. The second section deals with Durkheim and his arguments about primitive societies and the early Evolutionist arguments in regards to religion. The third section explains Durkheim’s view on social phenomenon as a social fact. Section four treats Durkheim’s view on the categories of human knowledge such as time, space, number, class and causality. Section five however explores Durkheim’s view on Totemism and the Aboriginal tribal society in Australia. Section six evaluates and reviews Durkheim’s theory of religion. The last section presents the conclusion of the study.

**Key Words**

Religion, Religious, The Truth, Primitive Society, Social Facts, Totemism.

**1. Introduction**

This study will elaborate the main points in which Durkheim focused in his last comprehensive published work ***The Elementary* *Forms* *of the Religious life,*** (hereafter called ***Elementary Forms***). In this work Durkheim focused on the Australian Aborigines as the best example for the elementary form of religion in society. In fact the original subtitle of the book is “Totemism in Australia”. The book organized by an introduction. Durkheim sought to conduct a sociological analysis in which all religions, primitive and modern are discussed on equal terms (Fournier, M, 2013: 605). For Durkheim the study of religion contributed to the understanding of society as a whole, and by 1895 he became much more aware of the importance of religion as a social phenomenon (Giddens, A, 1971: 105). In the ***Elementary*** ***Forms***, Durkheim offered the reader a vision of annual Australian effervescence, a totemic religion whose phratries were the elementary form of religious life, due to the fact that they were the most primitive and simplest possible organization (Kelly, J, 2014: 423). In many ways as Frank Pearce argued the ***Elementary Forms*** is innovative and wide-ranging text. It has generated numerous interpretations most of which indicate their appreciation for Durkheim’s scholarship in talking on the subject of religion (Pearce, F, 2014: 620). Indeed, Durkheim’s sociology has rightly been accused of ‘religio-centrism’ (Parkin, F, 1992: 43). His preoccupations with the causes and function of religion in the primitive past are very much driven by contemporary concerns. Durkheim’s thought has quite rightly been placed in the context of ninetieth century social evolutionary theory. His sociology opposes primitive society and modern society and elaborates a picture of a world becoming ever more rational and scientific. Evans-Pritchard has pointed out that the preoccupation of nineteenth century social thinkers with the study of primitive religion was motivated by a desire to intellectually undermine modern religion (Morris, B, 1987: 91-106). Yet, the truth in Durkheim’s case is slightly more complicated. As the British sociologist and political scientist Steven Lukes pointed out, the main issue in Durkheim’s thought “was to attain reality- to know how to go underneath the symbol to the reality which it represents and which gives it its true meaning”. Durkheim argued that “Primitive religions relate to reality and express it” (Lukes, S, 1973: 460 and Lukes, S, 2012: 43). More specifically, Durkheim claimed that “there are no religions which are false. All are true in their own fashion”. They were true in the sense that they stated and expressed in a none-objective, symbolic or metaphorical form, truths about the “reality” underlying them and giving them their “true meaning”. (ibid: 460-461). There is no independent divine reality that religious experience testiﬁes to; the reality that is the truth of religion is social and institutional. Durkheim argues that whilst the feelings of the faithful are not imaginary, they ‘are not privileged intuitions’. Their representation must be replaced with ‘a scientiﬁc and conceptual one’ (Durkheim, E, 1965: 420). For Durkheim, religion ‘cannot maintain itself . . . unless it proves to be *practically* true’ (ibid: 77, original emphasis).

**2. Durkheim, Primitive Societies and the Early Evolutionist’s Arguments**

Durkheim’s sociology of religion was indebted both to “Robertson and his school” and to “the ethnographers of England and America” (Lukes, S, 1973: 450). In the nineteenth century in Europe, many thinkers began to explain the roles and functions of religion in society; such as August Comte, Herbert Spencer, Max Miller and Robertson Smith. According to Brian Morris, Durkheim in fact had in ***The Division of Labour in Society*** (1893) typified primitive society as being homogenous, composed of similar small face to face groups, the members of which are engaged in similar activity. In this Mechanical Solidarity, the only discernible division of labour is really based on gender. Primitive society has a strong Conscience Collective, in that there is homogeneity in the way individuals conceive of the world and their society. This is the result of a high moral density, the strength of collective beliefs in relation to the individual, reinforced by repressive sanction. The dominating collective beliefs in such a society are religious (Morris, B. 1987: 106 & 111). The transition of traditional society to modern industrial society is propelled by the increasing division of labour. Durkheim was an atheist and described himself as a rationalist, but his thought was also a reaction against what he perceived as the inadequacies of the rationalist evolutionary tradition. In his introduction to ***Elementary*** ***Forms***, Durkheim distances himself from those ‘who have made religious history and theology a weapon against religion’ (Durkheim, E, 1965: 2). There is no relief however for the religiously minded in his approach. Max Muller, Herbert Spencer, Edward Tyler and James Frazer had sought to explain the development of religion in intellectual or psychological terms. The naturist school for instance saw religion as stemming from man personifying natural phenomenon while animism postulated that man derived the idea of spirits from dreams. Both conjured religiosity out of ‘sensations’ and for both ‘it is in the nature, either of man or of the universe, that we must look for the germ’ (ibid: 87) of religion. Such an approach means that man has superimposed ‘delusive representation’ on the natural world and himself as he has perceived them. Errors, says Durkheim, can never perpetuate themselves ‘unless they were true practically… unless without giving us a theoretically exact idea of the things with which they deal, they express well enough the manner in which they effect us’ (ibid: 80). Science has disproved religion yet the phenomenon has persisted (ibid: 83). In his second chapter, Durkheim develops his argument against ‘the leading conceptions’ of a science of religions – ﬁrstly, the animism of Edward Tylor and Herbert Spencer. He uses the idea of the truth and the reality of religion to oppose this. If animism were true then, religious beliefs are ‘so many hallucinatory representations without any objective bases. It cannot be an illusion because religion is ‘the well to which people in all ages have come to draw the energy they had to have in order to live’ (Durkheim, E, 1965: 66).

Durkheim cannot simply be distinguished from earlier evolutionists because they had neglected what might be called sociological view of the study of religion. Evans-Pritchard points out that thinkers as far back as Aristotle had noted the useful social functions which religion performed and the relationship between the religious belief and the society in which it is found. This theme, Evans-Pritchard says can be found in the Anthropological treatises of Herbert Spencer, Max Muller and others of the evolutionist tradition (Evans-Pritchard, 1965: 49-50). Durkheim himself was influenced but his teacher, Fustel Du Coulanges who had argued that history was a science of social facts. Morris pointed out that in ***The Ancient City***; Du Coulanges had argued that ancient society could only be understood by reference to the prevalent religious beliefs and those religious ideas were the cause of social change. Durkheim accused him of having mistaken symptoms for the cause (Morris, B, 1987: 111-112).

**3. Durkheim’s View on Social Phenomenon as a Social Fact**

Durkheim believed that social phenomenon such as religion could never be understood from the viewpoint of the individual or as the sum of individual attitudes and actions. Social phenomena were social facts and could only be understood from the point of view of other social facts. Social facts are indeed external and autonomous to the individual. Thus humans speak a language which they did not invent, have relations with other individuals who were not defined by them and are bound by customs, laws and cultures passed on from previous generations. Their reality might be felt subjectively, but this reality is still objective because the individual did not create them. Durkheim’s insistence on the dichotomy between the individual and society has been seen as a polemical device to establish the credentials of sociology as an academic discipline and Stephan Lukes believes that in overstating the case Durkheim severs social life from economic and natural moorings (Lukes, S, 1973: 108).

In ***The Rules of Sociological Method***, Durkheim defines a social fact as recognizable by ‘The power of external coercion which it exercises or is capable of exercising over individuals; and the presence of this power can be recognized in turn either by the existence of some definite sanction or by the resistance offered to each individual act which might contravene it’ (Giddens. A, 1972: 64). Social facts must be considered as ‘things’ and studied scientifically. ***The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*** therefore takes up ‘under new conditions, the old problem of the origin of religions’ (Durkheim, E, 1965: 8). According to Towler Durkheim’s theory can be said to do ‘justice to religious fact in a way no previous theory had done’ (Towler, R, 1974: 70-72).

Durkheim justifies studying the religion of the ‘lower’ society because he wishes to see how the phenomenon has been ‘composed in history’ (Durkheim, E, 1965: 3). Durkheim is not looking for the specific moment in history when religion begins, this he sees as speculation. He seeks the most elementary forms of religion, which can be ‘explained without making use of any element borrowed from a previous religion’ (ibid: 1). A primitive religion is solely made of the ‘common foundations’ of all religions. These common foundations are hidden beneath the ‘luxuriant vegetation’ of the theological disputes, ritual and organizational variations of more modern religion. ‘Things are different in the lower societies’, (ibid: 5), but then it might be said that they could not be otherwise to conform to Durkheim’s picture of primitive society set out in ***The Division of Labour in Society***.

**4. The Categories of Human Knowledge and Religion**

As mentioned earlier Durkheim’s major work ***Elementary Forms***  also deals with another theme, that of the social origin of the categories of human knowledge and understanding such as time, space, number, class and causality. Durkheim argues that categories of human knowledge and understanding are a product of society. More to the point, these categories of human knowledge and understanding are modeled on the structures of society. The scientific classification of things is based on the social classification of people and groups. Logical hierarchy is based on social hierarchy. Physical space is conceptualized in the categories that define social space. Scientific causality is based on the experience of the power of society over the individual (Durkheim, E, 1965: 55-65). In fact, Durkheim and Marcel Mauss had already approached this issue in their essay ***Primitive Classifications*** published in the “Anne Sociologique in 1902”. They had then argued that ‘humanity in the beginning lacks the most indispensable condition for the classificatory function’ (Durkheim, E and Marcel Mauss, M. 1963: 7). By examining ethnographic evidence of Aboriginal, Native Americans and Chinese Classification Systems, they had argued that classification was derived from man’s own social organization. Everything in the world of the aboriginal people’s world was classified by the Totemic classes and subclasses by which the Aborigines defined their own clan system. Thus any creature in nature may be seen as a member of a certain clan and is believed to have a kinship with that clan. The Zuni people of North America not only have a classification system but there is seen a direct relationship between the organization of their camps and that of their universe. ‘Cosmic space and tribal space are thus only very imperfectly distinguished, and the mind passes from one to the other without difficulty’ (ibid: 65).

The consideration of the categories of knowledge is allocated a secondary place in the considerations of ***Elementary Forms***. It is still, as we shall see, essential to Durkheim’s argument. According to Anthony Giddens in the ***Rules of Sociological Method***, Durkheim has said that ‘initial definition determines the very subject matter of science, this subject-matter will or will not be a thing, depending on the way in which definition is constructed’ (Giddens, A, 1972: 65). So, Durkheim begins his study of primitive religion with a search for an appropriate definition for the phenomenon. Definitions provided by other scholars are found inadequate, as they often rest upon a belief in a God or Gods. There are religions such as Buddhism which has no such object. Magic is distinguished from religion for though the former is often general, there is no binding organization, the ‘magician has a clientele not a church’ (Durkheim, E, 1965: 43). Durkheim defines a religion as ‘a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden- beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church all those who adhere to them’ (ibid: 47). Durkheim follows McLennan and Robertson-Smith in identifying Totemism as the elementary form of a man’s religiosity and the clan structure as a primary organizational form of primitive civilizations. The unity of Durkheim’s theory of knowledge and his theory of religion is therefore apparent. It could also be said at this stage that they could stand or fall together (Lukes, S, 1973: 454-457).

Durkheim’s idea that the primary and most fundamental form of classification is that of sacred and profane has been challenged. Evans-Pritchard says that there is no flexibility in this ‘rigid dichotomy’ and that in reality these categories can be indistinguishable. He examples the Azande warriors who use the ancestor shrine in their courtyards as a prop for their spears when they are not the occasion of veneration, More fundamentally perhaps, he points out that whether in fact the belief and ritual system upon which Durkheim based his study was in fact a religion at all can be debated (though he himself seems to agree with Durkheim that it is), (Evans-Pritchard, E, 1965: 64-65). Levi-Strauss does not see Totemism as a religion but a mode of thought (Morris, B, 1987: 127).

**5. Totemism and the Aboriginal Tribal Society**

Totemism++++++++++++++ is a belief system (Durkheim, E, 1965: 100). ***Elementary Forms*** is based on the existing work of anthropologists and ethnologists on the religious practices and social organization of Australian Aboriginal peoples. Durkheim’s picture of Aboriginal tribal society is one with clans holding ‘a preponderating place in the collective life’ (Durkheim, E, 1965: 102). A tribe is normally composed of two phratries or groupings of clans, each phratry having a specific totem. Clans are said to have a kinship or familial relations in the sense of obligation. Each clan has a totem as a collective badge and name which is specific to it. Durkheim supposes that phratries are earlier clans which have subdivided. Totems are normally animal or vegetable. Inanimate objects are used occasionally and more rarely ancestor totems are found. The clan totem stands in subordination to the phratry totem and sub totems. The Aboriginal conceives of himself as the same as his totem thus the Totemic system is not just a naming or badging system but goes beyond this. Some tribes have scared implements not dissimilar to the totemic poles of Native Americans. These subjects are scared because they have inscribed on them the totemic symbol. The individual too is therefore sacred in that he too is the totem (ibid: 101-187).

Durkheim argues that Totemism is not a form of object worship or ancestor cult. He believes that these sacred symbols are how the Aboriginals conceive an external impersonal force, the ‘Totemic Principle’, diffused in the universe, the material form under which the imagination represents this immaterial substance’ (ibid: 188-189). As Totems are symbols of the clan and symbols of a divine force, Durkheim concludes that God and Society must therefore be one (ibid: 206). All other theological elements of Australian tribal religion are explained as expressions of the Totemic Principle. The soul is the Totemic Principle individualized. Ideas of a great God are the expression of the tribal unity. For Durkheim Totemism was the primitive form of religion (Lukes, S, 1973: 454).

The religious practice is central to Durkheim’s theory. He sees aboriginal life as being composed of two phases, one dominated by dispersal for hunting and gathering and the other when the clan assembles for religious ritual or corroboree. These are periods of feasting, dietary and sexual license. During the rituals, there is intense excitement within the group, ‘a violent super-excitation of the physical and mental life’ (ibid: 215-216). It is the purposes of these rituals and the resultant collective ‘effervesce’ to bond the individual to the group and totem. Other rites such as those around the death of a member of the clan function to reassert the group after the death of one of its members. Primitive Religion and by generalization all religion, are therefore given ‘a meaning and reasonableness…It is a system of ideas with which the individuals represent to themselves the society of which they are members’ (Morris, B, 1987: 106-111).

**6. Evaluating and Reviewing Durkheim’s Theory of Religion**

***Elementary Forms*** labeled and seen in different ways- “as a study of Australian and American Totemism, as a completely a general theory of religion, as an incisive critique of other theories of Totemism and of religion and as Stephen Lukes pointed out as a contribution to the sociology of knowledge” (Lukes, S, 1973: 458-459).

Evans-Pritchard like many other schoolers has criticized Durkheim for his lack of personal fieldworks and sees him as an armchair theorist (Evans-Pritchard, E, 1965: 67). The Anthropological data concerning the Aboriginal people was both then (and indeed even now), inadequate for the purposes of the generalisations which Durkheim intended (ibid: 65-66). Evans-Pritchard points out that the clan is of lesser importance in the social organization of Aboriginal peoples than the horde of the tribe. It has been pointed out that there is totems for marriage classes in Aboriginal society but these have no corporate life (Worsley, P, 1990: 6). In other parts of Australia, Evans-Pritchard in reality is hostile to Durkheim’s whole approach, and sees such a ‘sociological meta-physic’ as yet another attempt to undermine religion as a whole (Morris, B, 1987: 107).

The father of Anthropology Bronislaw Malinowski in his review of ***Elementary Forms*** in the year of its publication criticized the ‘narrowness of Durkheim’s evidence’ (Hamilton, P, 1990: 15). And this has been echoed by many anthropologists since. Durkheim justified his study of Australian societies alone on the basis that the study to be valid must be based on clearly homogenous societies. Native American society, he considers more advanced than Aboriginal society. Their Totemism can be compared to Aboriginal Totemism as they are ‘successive moments of a single evolution’ (Durkheim, 1965: 96). Durkheim believes that his ‘one well-made experiment’ proves a case, then ‘it is inconceivable that the same effect may be due now to cause, now to another’ (ibid:102). Evans-Pritchard however sees Australian Totemism as untypical of Totemism as a general phenomenon among other people’s conclusions drawn from about Totemism, let alone any other religious forms (Evans-Pritchard, E, 1965: 66).

The well-known sociologist who specialized in the field of religion, Robert Towler, states that ***Elementary Forms*** is ‘wrong in almost every particular with which it dealt (Towler, R, 1974: 70-72). Yet, he argues a theory cannot alone be judged on the inadequacies of the data on which historically it was based. A theory might still be of value, if propositions derived from the theory can be confirmed by their application to other data. Durkheim has an immense effect on subsequent sociological and anthropological thought, particularly in the field of the study of religion. There are therefore no shortages of attempts to apply a structural functionality approach to Anthropological facts from which to take some examples.

The British Anthropologist A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, influenced by both Durkheim and Herbert Spencer stated that religious rites ‘have for their effect to regulate, maintain and transmit from one generation to another sentiments of which the constitution of the society depend’ (Morris, B, 1987: 127). The logical conclusion of this, as Evans-Pritchard has pointed out, is that certain type of religions forms will correspond with certain type of socio-political organisation. He points out that there are many exceptions, for instance, there are African tribes that have an Ancestor Cult but are not organized on lineage lines (Evans-Pritchard, E, 1965: 66).

According to Brian Morris, the British Anthropologist Mary Douglas also influenced by Durkheim had followed Durkheim in believing that religion in primitive societies was the dominant unifying force and cosmological theory. She later questioned whether the idea of pious primitives was a myth (Morris,B, 1987: 216-217). Evidence suggests that there are tribal peoples for whom religion is relatively unimportant and who might be described as secular. Pygmies are seen as irreligious and mock neighboring tribes’ solemn ceremonies (ibid: 226-230).

More to the point, Mary Douglas sought to explain this in a Durkheimian framework. She theorized that is a particular social experience produces a particular religious form, then a different type of experience might produce an irreligious attitude. She supposes two main groups of determinants which can be used to predict the religious forms of a particular society. Borrowing a grid-group analysis from linguistics, grid determines the degree to which a society has an ordered and coherent classification system, and group determines the strength which is competitive and which is characterized by a high degree of classification, such as the tribal societies of New Guinea, and as a result more pragmatic than religious (ibid: 226-230). This extension of Durkheimian method seems however to substantially demolish the main body of Durkheim’s sociology. The picture of a homogenous primitive past dominated by a religious moral unity can surely not be sustained against this flexibility. It is questionable whether Durkheim himself would have necessarily agreed with trying to read off religious form from social organization. The British Sociologist Frank Parkin (1931-2011) suggests that there is in Durkheim’s theory, a considerable autonomy for the religious form, once religious energies are released because of the intensity of social interaction (Parkin .F, 1992: 55).

For Durkheim, all forms of thought were originally derived from religion; science, philosophy and all other forms of thought gradually separate themselves out of religion. This is because religion in the form of Totemism expresses the earliest forms of classification and categorization. These classifications as we have seen are in Durkheim’s view were of social origin. Totemism must therefore represent the purest tangible expression of the Conscience Collective. If the elementary religion of primitive society is an expression of social reality, then surely it is precisely there that societal change must create an immediate reformation. This is acknowledged and has to be acknowledged in Durkheim’s theory, if it is to fit with his picture of the development of society. Yet, the nature of the relationship between religious change and societal change is vague and unexplained. Anthony Giddens has pointed out that collective ritual in Durkheim’s theory is not only about reinforcing the group and its beliefs, but is also the source of new ideas and forms (Giddens, A, 1971: 217).

Many Scholars have seen Durkheim’s theory of religion as being in some senses psychological, and have pointed to the influence of nineteenth century crowd psychologists such as the French Psychologist Gustave Le Bon on his theory. It has been said that the source of religion for Durkheim was not just society in ‘a state of collective delirium’ (Parkin, F, 1992: 55). In fact Durkheim had concluded his Elementary Forms by stating that the old gods were dead and ‘he declared the finis nature, the ultimate creation of nature, to be not “man” but society, the social and moral facts and not the biological human, the apex of evolution’ (Kelly, J, 2014: 426)

**7. Conclusion**

For Durkheim all religions are ‘true’ in the sense that they fulfill a function for the society and all deities are true in that they symbolize that society. Yet, according to Durkheim’s theory, a common belief was not enough; man also needed ceremonial and rite. In the conclusion of ***Elementary Forms***, Durkheim says that mankind would soon know again ‘those hours of creative effervescence, in the course of which new ideas arise and new formulae are found which serve for a while as a guide to humanity…keeping alive their memory by means of celebrations which regularly produce their fruit’ (Durkheim, 1965: 102). This sounds as much a wish as a prophesy. It reflects Durkheim’s desire for stabilising factors to emerge in his own society.

Though there is no romanticism of the primitive past by Durkheim, The British Sociologist Bryan Wilson may be right when he describes Durkheim’s life work, as a search for rational structures which might supply the latent needs of his own society as religion had in the past. Many critics have noted that there is little consideration of the variation of religion and the correspondence of these to groups, status and class within a single society. Durkheim’s analysis cannot contemplate the role of religion as an ideology for the domination of society by one group or another. The ‘truth’ of religion for Durkheim lies in collective endorsement. More specifically as we have seen Durkheim’s strongest point in his conception of religion as a social reality was his anti-reductionist stance and the ideas that came from it. In Durkheim’s view religion provided moral regulation in primitive societies, but the authority of religion is declining with the rise of science and increasing individualism. Thus Durkheim seeks a middle position of demonstrating the “truth” of religion through a scientific analysis.

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**ملخص الدراسة**

**تحليل سوسيولوجي لوجهة نظر أيميل دوركهايم عن حقيقة الدين بأعتباره تعبير عن الواقع الأجتماعي**

**لقد جلب الدين ودراسته أهتمام العديد من الفلاسفة والمفكرين في القرنين التاسع عشر والعشرين, خصوصأ علماء الأنثروبولوجيا والأجتماع. تـتناول وتشرح هذه الدراسة النظرية أفكار ووجهات نظر عالم الأجتماع الفرنسي أيميل دوركهايم (1858-1917). حيث تشرح وتحلل محاججته عن حقيقة وجود الدين كتعبير للواقع الأجتماعي . كان فهم دوركهايم للدين مرتبطأ ارتباطأ وثيقأ بفهمه وتعريفه للمجتمع. فالدين لديه هو نتاج المجتمع وهو القوة التي تعززه في نفس الوقت. وعليه فأن هذه الدراسة تركّز على واحدة من أخر وأهم الدراسات التي نشرها دوركهايم قبل وفاته ببضعة اعوام الا وهو كتاب " الأنماط الأولية للحياة الدينية". تبنت هذه الدراسة المنهج التفسيري في النقاش والتحليل.**

**تنقسم الدراسة الى سبعة مباحث. يتضمن المبحث الأول المقدمة ويتناول المبحث الثاني رأي دوركهايم عن المجتمعات البدائية ويناقش أراء التطوريين الأوائل عن موضوع الدين. أما المبحث الثالث فيتناول وبأسهاب رأي دوركهايم عن الظاهرة الأجتماعية بأعتبارها حقيقة أجتماعية ، في حين يتناول المبحث الرابع رأي دوركهايم حول المعرفة البشرية للتصنيفات والأنقسامات. أما المبحث الخامس فيركّز على وجهة نظر دوركهايم عن الطوطمية والمجتمع الأبورجينيزي العشائري في استراليا كسكان اصليين هناك. وخصّص المبحث السادس لتقييم واعادة القراءة لأفكار دوركهايم. اما المبحث السابع والأخير فيتناول أهم الأستنتاجات التي توصلت اليها الدراسة.**